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THE EFFECTS OF MALPRACTICE TORT REFORM ON DEFENSIVE MEDICINE
Katherine D. Hennesy
and
Heather M. O’Neill
Ursinus College
ABSTRACT
Positive defensive medicine occurs when physicians order additional tests or procedures primarily to avoid
malpractice liability. This paper shows the degree of defensive medicine occurring across states is related to the
malpractice environment in the states. As the environment changes due to malpractice tort reform, defensive
medicine practices also change. This paper shows the existence of positive defensive medicine and how it adds to
total health care expenditures for head trauma victims in 23 states in 2000. Moreover, given different malpractice
environments across states, we witness variations in defensive medicine practices leading to differences in health
care expenditures.

INTRODUCTION

MALPRACTICE THEORY AND PRACTICE

Doctors march on state capitols to bring attention to the
rising cost of malpractice insurance premiums.
Although declining reimbursements by private health
insurers and the federal government have hurt
physicians’ incomes, the chief culprit in the doctors’
dissatisfaction is rising malpractice insurance
premiums. While malpractice tort reform is debated in
state capitols and reforms are undertaken, another
implication needs to be addressed. How does the
malpractice environment affect doctors’ decisions in
treating patients and do these decisions contribute to
higher health care costs?

According to Danzon (1994), professional liability
systems are necessary in situations where asymmetric
information exists.
Physician’s extensive use of
medical jargon and patients’ inabilities to understand
such terminology is just one example of the information
gap that exists in medicine. Thus, the purpose of a
liability system like the medical malpractice system is
twofold; it is meant to both to deter negligence and
compensate patients injured as a result of negligent
care. A person is deemed injured if and only if the
injury was preventable and it was reasonable to
undertake preventive activities. Thus, adverse outcomes
resulting from normal risks of medical procedures
should not be considered under the medical malpractice
negligence rule.

The behavioral response of doctors to liability concerns
is called defensive medicine.
Positive defensive
medicine occurs when physicians order additional tests
or procedures primarily to avoid malpractice liability.
Negative defensive medicine occurs when doctors
avoid seeing risky patients. Since the early 1970’s
economists, lawyers, and those within the medical
community have debated the existence of defensive
medicine. While recent economic analyses support the
idea that physicians practice defensive medicine,
complexities surrounding the topic have prevented
economists from discerning its pervasiveness and direct
contribution to health care costs. Given the role
defensive medicine plays in health care and the scarcity
of studies that link it to the malpractice environment,
this study examines positive defensive medicine across
states in light of differences in the states’ malpractice
environments.

Regarding liability insurance, economic theory states
that premiums should reflect the expected cost of
claims based on individual physician’s standards of
care. Theory predicts that experience rating malpractice
premia ensure that the physicians sued most often pay
the highest malpractice premia, not unlike the
automobile driver who pays the highest insurance rates
because of multiple accidents. However, this is not the
standard practice. Malpractice premia are experience
rated across specialties, but not across doctors within a
region within a specialty. A community rating is used
within a specialty across regions. For example, the
Philadelphia Inquirer (2003) reports an obstetrician in
Philadelphia paid on average $140,000 per year for
malpractice insurance, compared to $67,000 in Los
Angeles, indicating different community ratings across
states. These state variations in premia are the result of
the malpractice tort law itself, since these laws are
created by state legislatures. For instance, statute of
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limitations, capped damages, etc. vary across the
country.

PREVIOUS STUDIES OF DEFENSIVE
MEDICINE

Experience ratings differ across specialties with riskier
practices, say obstetrics, paying more. An orthopedic
surgeon in Philadelphia only paid $115,000 on average
in 2003 compared to the above obstetrician, according
to the Philadelphia Inquirer (2003). Experience rating
within a specialty could have the effect of retarding
new technological procedures, which is why it is not
used. It would effectively punish the doctors utilizing
new, perhaps initially riskier techniques, causing
doctors to shy away from newly emerging procedures.
Such incentives could retard the forward movement of
technological medical procedures. In addition to
specialty rating, malpractice premia are also experience
rated by location. Physicians from locales with above
average suit awards will have higher premia due to
higher insurer payouts.
Frequency and severity
variations within a state result in regional specialty
specific premia variations. As such, Philadelphia
orthopedic surgeons paid $7,000 more on average than
doctors in adjacent Montgomery County due to
Philadelphia’s high jury payouts, according to the
Philadelphia Inquirer (2003).

There are three methods to determine the existence and
magnitude of defensive medicine: direct physician
surveys; hypothetical clinical scenarios; and healthcare
utilization studies. An OTA (1994) review of direct
physician surveys shows physicians do practice both
positive and negative defensive medicine. Sixteen
studies reviewed by OTA found anywhere from 21 to
81 percent of physicians ordered additional tests out of
fear of litigation. It is difficult to determine from these
surveys, however, how often and to what extent it is
practiced.

Unfortunately, the community rated system has its own
disadvantages. Because physicians are grouped by
specialty, they may experience premium increases if
claim volume or claim awards grow within their
specialty, regardless of their personal malpractice
claims history. At this point, insurance companies are
not offering hybrid pricing systems combining the
advantages of both community and experience rating;
community rating is the standard pricing technique.
Malpractice laws reside within state civil codes, either
tort or contract, although there has been some
discussion of instituting federal laws. The litigation
process involves three steps, each of which increases
litigation expenses. In the first step plaintiffs file suit.
Lawyers screen potential cases due to the US tradition
of contingency-based legal fees. If expected costs of
litigation are less than the expected payout, a suit is
filed. In pretrial discovery, the second step of litigation,
defendants and plaintiffs exchange information by
releasing medical records and naming expert witnesses,
and the plaintiff officially names medical personnel
involved in the incident. The third step of litigation,
trial or settlement, is preceded in some states by
voluntary or mandatory arbitration, which offer
incentives to settle out of court by eliminating costs
associated with trial.

A second branch of literature uses physician surveys to
assess actions given specific clinical situations. An
advantage of this type of survey is the ability to focus
on physician specialties and clinical scenarios in which
defensive medicine is a concern. In an OTA (1994)
study, the percentage of respondents who chose
“malpractice concerns” as the primary reason for
administering a clinical action ranged from 4.9 (back
pain scenario) to 29.0 percent (head trauma scenario). It
was estimated the aggregate cost of defensive Cesarean
deliveries to be $8.7 million in 1991 compared to the
aggregate cost of defensive diagnostic radiology of the
head for Americans ages 5 to 24 to be $45 million.
While these studies provide an additional verification of
the existence of defensive medicine, their hypothetical
basis limits their predictive power and creates bias.
Thus, a third branch of defensive medicine statistically
analyzes the impact of liability risk on health care
utilization.
For example, Localio et. Al. (1993)
examine the relationship between malpractice liability
risk and the rates of Cesarean deliveries in a sample of
New York state hospitals in 1984. The authors found
that a patient in a hospital with high frequency obstetric
malpractice claims was 32 percent more likely to
undergo a Cesarean delivery than a patient in a hospital
with low claim frequency.
PAST NATIONAL MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
CRISES AND TORT REFORM
Literature on malpractice has identified two previous
times during which the system was in crisis: one in the
1970’s and one in the 1980’s. Danzon (1984) cites
stock market volatility and long claims tails as major
contributors to the depletion in insurance capital in the
1970s.
Both encouraged insurers to seek large
premium increases to shore up depleted capital reserves
in 1974-75. These premium increases led to crises in
which physicians had difficulty paying for malpractice
premiums.
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Harrington and Danzon (1984) contend the 1980s crisis
was the result of price undercutting and inadequate risk
information.
They believe the largest insurers
deliberately underreported claims and used reinsurance
to hide losses. Additionally, Danzon (1983) also finds
the rising cost of malpractice claims due to pro-plaintiff
trends in laws, erosion of traditional malpractice
defenses (like the locality rule and charitable
immunity), growth in the number and complexity of
medical treatments, an increase in the number of
lawyers per capita, and erosion of the patient-physician
relationship leading to higher insurance rates.
In response to the malpractice crises occurring in the
1970’s and 1980’s, states enacted various tort reforms.
Some are termed “indirect” reforms in that they
indirectly reduce malpractice awards. Barker (1992)
notes several indirect reforms following the first two
crises. He indicates 34 states reduced their statute of
limitations to two to three years and many decreased
the length of time permitted for injury discovery.
Several reforms that “directly” reduced awards also
followed the crises. After 1975, nine states enacted
reforms capping malpractice awards values; seven
states capped total damage awards while two states
capped only noneconomic damages of pain and
suffering. Several states created Patient Compensation
Funds (PCF), in which physicians were responsible for
awards up to a certain dollar amount, after which the
PCF paid the rest of the award due. Modification of the
collateral source rule was also enacted. Originally, this
rule prohibited evidence of collateral award sources to
be introduced to the jury. Reform allowed juries to
consider, and sometimes mandated, that they lower
awards when plaintiffs had collateral award sources.
These collateral sources could include other physicians,
hospitals, or insurance companies. By enacting such
reforms, plaintiffs could no longer receive duplicate
malpractice awards from multiple sources; it eliminated
double dipping.
To reduce costs associated with litigation, three major
reforms were enacted. First, some states mandated
pretrial screening. This reform required potential cases
be screened by a panel before proceeding to trial; cases
deemed unworthy did not reach trial, thus eliminating
unnecessary trial expenses. Barker (1992) shows
thirteen states created provisions for arbitration, either
voluntary or mandatory, between pretrial discovery and
trial, in order to eliminate expenses associated with
trial. Under the process of arbitration, plaintiffs and
defendants submit their claim to a third party who
makes a decision regarding the case outcome. Under
mandatory arbitration third party decisions are binding
and cannot be appealed. A third reform, capped
contingency fees for attorneys, limits the percentage of
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the award collected by lawyers following successful
trials.
California can be viewed as a case study in tort reform.
California was one of the first states to pursue tort
reform aggressively, according to the Philadelphia
Inquirer (2003). In 1975, California passed state passed
the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act, MICRA,
which: capped pain and suffering awards to $250,000;
enforced a collateral source rule; limited lawyers
contingency fees to 40% for the first $50,000 awarded,
33% for awards between $50,000-$100,000; 25% for
the next half million; and 15% for amounts in excess of
$600,000; reduced the statue of limitations to three
years; and allowed periodic payments non-mandatory
arbitration. Then in 1991, Proposition 103 passed to
mitigate rising insurance fees by requiring regulatory
approval. Today, states such as Pennsylvania and New
Jersey look to the California system as a model,
according to the Philadelphia Inquirer (2003).
Kessler and McClellan’s (1996) study examines how
tort reform and malpractice environments impact
defensive medicine. They are interested in the effects
of indirect and direct reforms on positive defensive
medicine. This study focuses on cardiac patients. The
authors used a difference-in-difference analysis of
longitudinal data on Medicare patients from 1984,
1987, and 1990 who treated for acute myocardial
infarction (AMI) and new ischemic heart disease (IHD).
They compared outcomes among states with reforms
and without reforms. Tort law reforms were divided
into two categories: direct, which directly reduce
expected malpractice awards such as damage caps and
mandatory collateral-source offsets and indirect ones
such as mandatory periodic payments, statute of
limitations reductions, or modification of the joint and
several liability rule, which have a less discernable
impact on malpractice pressures. Joint and several
liability rules allocate payments according to degree of
fault. Kessler and McClellan examine the occurrence
of adverse outcomes one year after cardiac illness,
including subsequent AMI, heart failure requiring
hospitalization, and mortality. The magnitude of
defensive medicine was estimated by the cost of an
additional year of life to treatment intensity used.
Results from their study indicate reform states and nonreform states had similar baseline expenditures and
outcomes. However, expenditure growth was 2-6%
lower in reform states than in non-reform states for
AMI. Trends for IHD showed slightly greater
differences. Expenditures in states adopting direct
reforms declined 5.3% relative to non-reforming states
and expenditures in states with indirect reforms
increased 1.8% relative to non-reforming states. The
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adoption of malpractice reforms lead to reductions in
hospital expenditures of 5% for AMI and 9% for IHD
by five years after reform adoption. Overall, the results
of the study show direct reforms reduce expenditure
growth without increasing mortality, while indirect
reforms have no substantial effects on expenditure or
mortality.
HEALTHCARE UTILIZATION MODEL OF
DEFENSIVE MEDICINE
We build a healthcare utilization model to estimate the
individual impacts of twelve tort reform measures. The
purpose of the analysis is to discover how state
malpractice environments influence the practice of
positive defensive medicine. The scope of the study is
limited to patients with skull fractures. Since these
patients are associated with a high level of risk and
uncertainty, it is likely that physicians practice
defensive medicine on them. Thus, reductions in state
malpractice pressures could diminish the level of
defensive medicine associated with these patients, and
result in substantial cost savings. The healthcare
utilization model of defensive medicine is as follows:
CHARGES =
b0 + bPPatient Demographics +
bHHospital Demographics + bTTort Reform + μ
(1)
The dependent variable, total in-patient hospital
expenditures (CHARGES), is used to assess the level of
defensive medicine practiced in each state. To construct
a model distinguishing the effect of state malpractice
environmental factors from other factors contributing to
variations in patients’ total expenditures, independent
variable vectors accounting for patient, bP, and hospital
demographics, bH , have been included. Dummy
variables for various tort reforms serve as identifiable
measures of differences in state malpractice
environments. Chart 1 gives the matrix describing tort
reforms in each of the 23 states included in this
analysis. Table 1 lists the 12 dummy variables for the
malpractice tort laws created for each state.
Several variables within the patient demographic vector
account for differences in patient’s hospital experiences
and skull fracture injuries. Ultimately each can be held
constant to examine the role of tort reform on total
charges, though each variable will have its own
individual impact on charges. A patient’s length of
stay, number of diagnoses, and number of medical
procedures, all indicators of the patient’s hospital
experience, are expected to positively impact charges.
Since hospitals charge a minimum daily fee for
inpatient visits on top of charges associated with tests
and procedures, increasing a patient’s length of stay or
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increasing the number of procedures performed will
increase a patient’s total charges. It is also reasonable
to expect that a patient with more severe injuries will
have more diagnoses recorded on his or her hospital
encounter than a patient with less severe injuries; thus,
the number of diagnoses on a patient’s hospital
encounter serves as a proxy for the patient’s extent of
injury. All three variables are expected to have positive
coefficients.
Other general patient demographics are also included in
the patient demographic vector, as evident in Tables 2
and 3. The hospital demographic vector is made up of
several variables, including variables describing
hospital control, size, location, and teaching status. If
government and non-profit facilities are less costconscious than for-profit facilities, they may have
higher patient expenditures for patients with the same
set of diagnoses, leading to an expected positive sign on
the government and non-profit facilities coefficients.
Since the other patient and hospital demographic
variables are used as control variables to be held
constant to discern the impact of individual tort
variables, a full discussion of the remaining
coefficients’ expected signs is excluded.
To consider differences in state malpractice
environments, dummy variables for 12 various tort
reforms are included in the model. These reforms are:
arbitration, pre-judgment measures, contingency fee
caps, collateral source rules, damage caps, joint and
several liability rules, periodic payments, physician
compensation funds, and state’s statutes of limitations.
Within these reforms, the effects of voluntary
arbitration versus mandatory arbitration, and the option
to elect periodic payments versus mandatory periodic
payments are considered. Periodic payments imply the
award is paid over time, not in a lump sum, and they
cease if the patient dies. We also separate damage cap
reforms into two groups: those that limit noneconomic
or total awards and those that only limit punitive
damage awards. We hypothesize physicians working in
states that have enacted malpractice tort reforms will
feel less malpractice pressure than physicians working
in states without malpractice reforms. In turn, these
physicians will practice less defensive medicine than
their counterparts in non-reform states; they will not
order as many additional tests and procedures out of
fear of litigation. Based on this, the above mentioned
tort dummy variables are expected to have negative
coefficients.
DATA
The data come from two major sources. Information on
total expenditures, patient demographics, and hospital
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demographics for patients who had primary, secondary,
or tertiary diagnoses of skull fractures were derived
from the 2000 Nationwide Inpatient Sample, part of the
Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project sponsored by
the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. The
diagnoses codes for skull fractures are based on the
ICD-9CM codes valid for the patient’s discharge date
and include: 800.00-800.99 (fracture of skull vault),
801.00-801.99 (fracture of skull base), and 803.00803.99 (other and unqualified skull fractures).
Information on ICD-9-CM codes was obtained from a
topsSearch ICD-9 Trial on e-mds.com and UMEA
University’s
online
directory
of
ICD-9-CM
International Coding Standard. The data set contains
7,450,992 inpatient hospital stays from 994 hospitals in
28 states. Concentrating on a significant number of
skull fractures the data were limited to 23 states:
Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida,
Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North
Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and
Wisconsin.
We understand significant differences in hospital
charges can be due to extreme differences in patients.
We attempt to make patients as similar as possible by
using several restrictions on the patients considered in
this study so that expenditure differences are more
likely to be due to differences in state environments.
Age is restricted to patients 18 to 65 old for two
reasons. First, minors are eliminated because they are
subject to different malpractice statutes of limitations in
many states. Second, the elderly are eliminated because
literature on malpractice suits has shown that successful
elderly claimants are awarded low dollar amounts due
to their advanced age.
Thus, theory holds that
physicians are less likely to practice defensive on this
demographic group. Also, due to deteriorating health
and health complications, the elderly are likely to be
outliers with respect to length of stay, number of
diagnoses, total charges, etc. To further reduce outliers
patients considered in this study are restricted to those
whose length of stay was ten days or less and who had
ten or fewer diagnoses on their hospital encounter.
Table 2 describes the means and standard deviations of
the variables used in regression analysis.
The total charges obtained from the NIS are altered to
consider state and regional variations in the price of
medical care services.
This is accomplished by
dividing regional or city CPI data for a given state by a
base state’s CPI, thereby setting patient charges from
all states on equal footing. CPI data for the year 2000
were obtained from the Urban Consumer Series “All
Items” CPI index available on Bureau of Labor
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Statistics’ website. If data for a metropolitan area
within a given state were available or the state was cited
as having a CPI value corresponding to a metropolitan
area in a nearby state, this CPI value was used. If data
for several metropolitan areas within a state or
corresponding to a state were available, the average of
these values were used. For states in which there were
no corresponding metropolitan areas associated, the
regional (Northeast, Midwest, South, or West) “All
Items” Urban CPI value was used. Kansas was selected
as the base state in this analysis because of its baseline
number of malpractice tort reforms. This method of
CPI base lining is the best approximation that can be
made, given the limited amount of CPI information
available for locations around the nation.
The second major source of data, from which
information on state tort laws is compiled, come from
the American Medical Association Advocacy Resource
Center’s state law charts on liability reform. The
dummy variables are listed in Table 2 for each state.
Since the patient and hospital data are for 2000, we use
the tort law in place in 1998 to allow for a two year,
albeit arbitrary, lag for doctors to respond to incentives.
RESULTS
Regression results are reported in Table 3. Using
ordinary least squares, the adjusted R-squared value is
48.62, implying 48.6% of the variation in total charges
can be explained by the variation in the independent
variables. The mean total charge for patients with skull
fractures is $21,127. The condition index of 35.91
suggests
multicollinearity exists, but it is
inconsequential in that numerous statistically
coefficients with the expected sign are found. Based on
the results of White’s test, the null hypothesis of
homoscedasticity was rejected.
The T-values are
found using White’s consistent estimators of the
variance and are indicated in parentheses in below the
coefficients in Table 3.
Table 3 shows each additional day in the hospital is
expected to increase total charges by $3,191, ceteris
paribus, whereas an additional procedure raises them by
$3,716. Similar interpretations of coefficients of the
many statistically significant patient and hospital
demographic variables are easily obtainable, but the
thrust of this paper is on the reform coefficients.
All but one tort reform, voluntary arbitration, is
statistically significant.
The tort reform with the
largest coefficient, indicating the most important reform
in terms of savings from reduced defensive medicine, is
mandatory arbitration.
Having a provision for
mandatory arbitration reduces total skull fracture
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charges by $12,177, a significant amount compared to
the dependent mean of $21,127. This result supports
the theory that physicians fear malpractice suits going
to court and practice less defensive medicine when suits
must first be assessed outside of court. Interestingly,
having a voluntary arbitration policy has no impact on
charges, thus on defensive medicine, implying the
policy needs to have teeth, i.e., be mandated. Similar
to mandatory arbitration, pre-judgment measures reduce
charges by $5,174.99. Physicians will practice less
defensive medicine if states screen claims before they
can proceed to court because physicians are confident
an objective board will eliminate frivolous suits.
Enacting contingency fee caps reduce charges by
$4,534.50 or 20% of the average charges. A possible
explanation for this reduction is that caps force
attorneys to more closely scrutinize potential cases,
resulting in fewer malpractice cases going to court. In
turn, physicians may feel less pressure to practice
defensive medicine due to the reduced frequency, and
therefore probability, of malpractice court cases being
filed.
Physicians may order fewer extraneous tests or
procedures when they have a decreased risk of having
their assets wiped out in a malpractice suit. The fear of
litigation rises with the size of the expected payout.
Doctors are not only concerned with the immediate
payouts they may incur, but the impact on their
insurance premium. Policies reducing the expected
payout, such as periodic payments and joint and several
liability rules, are expected to reduce defensive
medicine. Making physicians responsible for the same
proportion of damages as their actions though the joint
and several liability rule reduces charges by $2,474.77.
Mandatory periodic payments reduce charges by
$7,842.91.
Additionally, the existence of state
physician compensation funds reduces defensive
medical care by $1,856.49. Here, states pick up the
portion of the payout above what the insurer will pay on
behalf of the doctor. Interestingly, permitting periodic
payment actually increases total charges by $2,775.17,
in contrast with expectations.
Some results are contrary to expectations.
The
coefficient on the statute of limitations variable
indicates that for each additional year a patient is able
to take medical liability action, there is a $1,504.69
decrease in total charges for skull fracture patients.
Theory predicts allowing patients an additional year to
take action will increase the volume of malpractice
claims filed, thus causing physicians to practice more
defensive medicine; if a physician knows that a patient
has more years in which he or she can file a malpractice
suit, then perhaps the physician orders more tests for
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protection from a suit claiming that the proper standard
of care was not met. More research on the relationship
between defensive medicine and statute of limitations
reductions is needed before firm conclusions can be
drawn.
In contrast to theory, the collateral source rule and
damage cap reforms significantly increase total charges.
Having a collateral source reform, which eliminates
double dipping for awards, increases charges by
$3,866.88. Caps on noneconomic or total awards
increase charges by $2,584.30, while caps on punitive
damages only increase charges by $2,226.01. A
possible explanation for these unexpected results is they
result from an endogenous relationship between tort
reforms and state malpractice environments. Tort
reforms are generally enacted in states after some sort
of malpractice crisis exists. These crises resulting from
long claim tails, high numbers of malpractice suits, and
severe damage awards, are often manifested through
large annual physician malpractice premium increases;
reforms on the collateral source rule and damage caps
are generally enacted when a state is in crisis. Thus, the
significantly positive coefficients on collateral source
rule reforms, noneconomic/total award damage caps,
and punitive damage caps most likely reflect this
endogenous relationship between states in malpractice
crises and the reforms they enact. The positive
coefficients may reflect lingering crises effects
originating before the reforms were enacted.
CONCLUSIONS
The regression results provide strong evidence that
variations in state malpractice environments
significantly influence the level of defensive medicine
practiced by physicians on skull fracture patients. On
the upper end, states enacting mandatory arbitration
could reduce charges by $12,177, over half the mean
hospital charge for skull fracture patients. Those
enacting various pre-judgment measures could save
$5,175, whereas capping attorney fees could save
$4,534 per skull fracture patient. States mandating
periodic payment of awards could also significantly
reduce defensive medical charges by $7,843 per skull
fracture patient. In contrast, damage caps and collateralsource rule reforms increase patient expenditures.
The results are consistent with some of Kessler and
McClellan’s (1996) findings, though contrary to others.
Both studies find that joint and several liability rules
and mandatory periodic payments reduce patient
expenditures. Kessler and McClellan (1996), however,
show damage caps reduce expenditures, contrary to
findings here. Danzon (1986) finds damage caps
decrease claims severity, but not their frequency. If this
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is the case, then physicians do not perceive a reduced
likelihood of being sued with damage caps in place and
thus do not practice less defensive medicine, which
would contradict Kessler and McClellan’s findings.
The positive coefficient on damage caps here is not
inconsistent with Danzon, and as mentioned previously,
the endogeniety between higher medical costs
malpractice crises may best explain it.
The major weakness of this study is that health
outcomes are not held constant due to lack of data
availability. Kessler and McClellan (1996) found no
evidence of differences in health outcomes, and we take
the liberty of presuming that would be the case with
skull fracture patients. Despite this limitation, the
results suggest significant costs savings from reduced
defensive medicine. Based on the national estimate by
Kraus et AL. (1996) that approximately 2 million head
injuries occur each year, enacting mandatory arbitration
could save over $24 billion in skull fracture defensive
medical practices. Considering this estimate represents
savings from only one percent of the total patient
population, policy makers should seriously consider the
impact of state malpractice tort reforms on the practice
of defensive medicine.
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Chart 1
Reform
Arbitration (Permitted)
Arbitration (Mandatory)
Pre-judgment
Contingency Fee Cap
Statute of Limitations
Collateral Source Rule Reform
Damage Caps (noneconomic
or total damages)
Damage Caps (punitive
damages)
Joint and Several Liability
Rule Reform
Periodic Payment of Awards
(Permitted)
Periodic Payment of Awards
(Mandatory)
Physician Compensation Fund
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Malpractice Tort Laws Used in Analysis.
Description of reform
Arbitration is permitted, but not mandated.
Arbitration is mandated.
Claimants need to obtain a certificate of affidavit of merit within a certain amount of time in
order to pursue medical liability action.
The proportion of an award that an attorney can contractually charge is statutorily capped at
a specific level.
The maximum number of years (from incident occurrence, discovery, or the maximum time
limit) during which a claimant can commence an action for medical liability
Damages payable in a malpractice suit are statutorily reduced by all or part of the dollar
value of collateral-source payments to the plaintiff.
Either noneconomic, total damages, or both types of damages are capped at a statutorily
established dollar amount.
Punitive damages are capped at a statutorily established dollar amount.
The Joint and Several Liability rule is abolished either for noneconomic or total damages in
all claims, such that damages payable in a malpractice suit are statutorily allocated in
proportion to the tortfeasors’ degree of fault.
Part or all of the damages are permitted to be disbursed in the form of an annuity that pays
out over time.
Part or all of the damages must to be disbursed in the form of an annuity that pays out over
time.
A state-administered excess malpractice liability insurance program exists for physicians.
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Table 1
State

State Tort Coding Matrix

Arbit PreJudge

ContFeeCap StatLim CollSoRef DamCap JntSevL PeriodPay PCF

AZ

0

0

0

2

1

0

1

0

0

CA

1

0

1

3

1

1

0

1

0

CO

1

1

0

3

1

1

1

2

0

CT

1

0

1

3

1

0

1

1

0

FL

1

1

0

4

0

0

1

1

1

IL

0

1

1

4

1

0

0

1

0

KS

1

1

0

4

0

1

1

1

0

KY

0

0

0

1

0

0

1

1

0

MA

0

0

1

7

1

1

0

0

0

MD

2

1

0

5

0

1

0

1

0

MO

0

1

0

10

0

1

0

1

0

NC

2

0

0

4

0

0

0

0

0

NJ

0

1

1

2

1

2

1

0

0

NY

1

1

1

2.5

1

0

1

2

0

OR

0

0

1

5

0

0

0

0

0

PA

1

0

0

7

0

2

0

1

1

SC

1

0

0

6

0

0

0

0

1

TN

1

0

0

3

1

0

1

0

0

TX

1

1

0

2

0

2

1

0

0

VA

2

0

0

2

0

1

0

1

0

WA

2

0

0

8

1

0

0

1

0

WI

1

0

1

5

1

1

1

1

1

GA

1

1

0

5

0

2

0

0

0

STATE TORT CODING KEY *
*All reforms took effect in prior to 1998 in order to allow for lag time between tort reform enactment and physician behavior
change.
Arbitration:
Arbit= 0 if there are no provisions for arbitration.
Arbit= 1 if there arbitration is permitted (voluntary) .
(In regression analysis transformed to: ArbitVol= 1.)
Arbit= 2 if there arbitration is mandatory .
(In regression analysis transformed to: ArbitMand= 1.)
Pre-judgment measures:
PreJudge= 0 if claimants do not need to obtain a certificate/affidavit of merit within a certain amount of time in order
to pursue a medical liability action .
PreJudge= 1 if claimants must (mandated) file a certificate/affidavit of merit within a certain amount of time in order
to pursue a medical liability action .
Contingency Fee Caps:
ContFeeCap= 0 if contingency fees are not capped (This includes HI, IA, and WA where courts must approve/determine
reasonable contingency fees.)
ContFeeCap= 1 if contingency fees are capped.
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Statute of Limitations:
StatLim= #. This number is the maximum number of years (from incident occurrence or discovery) during which a claimant
can commence an action for medical liability. In cases where there were different time limits for occurrence, discovery, or a
maximum statute of limitations I have used the maximum time limit.
Collateral Source Rule:
CollSoRef= 0 if the collateral source rule is in effect (juries cannot consider claimants’ external compensation sources).
CollSoRef= 1 if the collateral source rule has been reformed such that juries are permitted to consider claimants’ external
compensation sources.
Damage Caps:
DamCap= 0 if there are no caps on any type of damage award .
DamCap= 1 if there are caps on noneconomic/total damages.
(In regression analysis transformed to: DamCapNT= 1.)
DamCap= 2 if there are caps on punitive damages only
(In regression analysis transformed to: DamCapPun= 1.)
Joint and Several Liability Rule:
JntSevL= 0 if joint and several liability is in effect (joint tortfeasors are each responsible for the entire judgment)
JntSevL= 1 if joint and several liability has been reformed such that damages are allocated in proportion to tortfeasors’ degree
of fault)
Periodic Payment of damages:
PeriodPay= 0 if there are no provisions for periodic payments of damages
PeriodPay= 1 if periodic payment of damages is permitted, but mandated
(In regression analysis transformed to: PerPayPerm = 1.)
PeriodPay= 2 if periodic payment of damages is mandated
(In regression analysis transformed to: PerPayMand = 1.)
Physician Compensation Funds:
PCF= 0 if the state did not have a patient compensation fund in 2000.
PCF= 1 if the state had a patient compensation fund in 2000.
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Table 2. Means and standard deviations of variables used in regression analysis.

Variables
Patient Demographics
(AGE): Age
(FEMALE): Gender
(MEDICAID): Medicaid Insurance
(PRIVATE): Private Insurance
(TWENTYFIVE): Income $25,000-34,999
(THIRTYFIVE): Income $35,000-44,999
(FORTYFIVE): Income $45,000 +
Patient Hospital Stay Demographics

Standard
Mean Deviation

35.190
0.190
0.101
0.476
0.277
0.256
0.312

12.499
0.392
0.301
0.499
0.448
0.438
0.463

(LOS): Length of Stay
(NDX): Number of Diagnoses
(NPR): Number of Procedures
Hospital Demographics

3.584
5.854
2.182

2.634
2.438
2.329

(TEACH): Teaching facility
(URBAN): Urban location
(LARGE): Large size
(PUBLIC): Public facility
(VOLUNTARY): Non-profit facility
Malpractice Tort Law Reforms

0.572
0.885
0.690
0.087
0.149

0.499
0.319
0.462
0.282
0.356

0.617
0.098
0.535
0.466
3.950
0.537
0.404
0.207
0.622
0.582
0.095
0.201

0.486
0.298
0.499
0.497
2.009
0.499
0.491
0.405
0.485
0.493
0.293
0.400

(ARBITVOL): Arbitration- Voluntary
(ARBITMAND): Arbitration- Mandatory
(PREJUDGE): Pre-judgment
(CONTFEECAP): Contingency Fee Cap
(STATLIM): Statute of Limitations
(COLLSOREF): Collateral Source Rule
(DAMCAPNT): Damage Caps- Noneconomic/Total damages
(DAMCAPPUN): Damage Caps- Punitive
(JNTSEVL): Joint and Several Liability
(PERPEYPERM): Periodic Payment- Permitted
(PERPAYMAND): Periodic Payment- Mandatory
(PCF): Physician Compensation Fund
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Table 3. Regression Results. (T values in parentheses.)a
Adjusted R2 = 0.4862
Variables
Intercept

Condition Index = 35.91244
Coefficient
Estimatesb
-$130.98
(-0.06)

Patient Demographics
(AGE): Age
(FEMALE): Gender
(MEDICAID): Medicaid Insurance
(PRIVATE): Private Insurance
(TWENTYFIVE): Income $25,000-34,999
(THIRTYFIVE): Income $35,000-44,999
(FORTYFIVE): Income $45,000 +

-$130.98
(-0.83)
-$17.34**
(-2.71)
$3,596.63**
(2.85)
$30.30
(0.06)
-$1,535.95
(-1.54)
-$1,410.69
(-1.50)
$1,841.90
(1.90)*

Patient Hospital Stay Demographics
(LOS): Length of Stay
(NDX): Number of Diagnoses
(NPR): Number of Procedures

$3,191.70***
(25.59)
$191.68
(1.59)
$3,716.70***
(15.88)

Hospital Demographics
(TEACH): Teaching facility
(URBAN): Urban location
(URBAN): Large size
(PUBLIC): Public facility
(VOLUNTARY): Non-profit facility

$654.39
(0.64)
$7,063.70***
(8.29)
$3,954.61***
(7.22)
$2,686.13**
(2.29)
$2,714.92**
(2.00)

Dependent Mean (Total Charges) = $21,127
Variables

Coefficient Estimatesa

Malpractice Tort Law Reforms
(ARBITVOL): Arbitration- Voluntary

$686.81
(0.67)
(ARBITMAND): Arbitration-$12,177.00***
Mandatory
(-10.40)
(PREJUDGE): Pre-judgment
-$5,174.99***
(-6.18)
(CONTFEECAP): Contingency Fee
-$4,534.50***
Cap
(-5.27)
(STATLIM): Statute of Limitations
-$1,504.69***
(-8.98)
(COLLSOREF): Collateral Source Rule $3,866.88***
(4.73)
(DAMCAPNT): Damage Caps$2,584.30***
Noneconomic/Total
(3.97)
(DAMCAPPUN): Damage Caps$2,226.01**
Punitive
(2.01)
(JNTSEVL): Joint and Several Liability
-$2,474.77**
(-2.69)
(PERPAYPERM): Periodic Payment$2,775.17***
Permitted
(3.48)
(PERPAYMAND): Periodic Payment-$7,842.91***
Mandatory
(-5.32)
(PCF): Physician Compensation Fund
-$1,856.49**
(-2.03)
a
T values produced using White’s consistent
estimators of the variance.
b

All coefficient estimates have been deflated to 2000 dollars.
*Significant at the 10% confidence level.

**Significant at the 5% confidence level.
***Significant at the 1% confidence level.

